Jubilee dates of non-festive events
We live in a very interesting and extremely difficult time. The familiar world is changing rapidly before our eyes. The processes that previously occupied centuries now fit in years, a maximum of one and a half to two decades.
Some 35 years ago, the USSR seemed indestructible, and even the CIA, actively fighting it, did not believe in the possibility of its collapse in the foreseeable future. 25 years ago, the Soviet Union was already three years old, there was a new Constitution in Russia, and the Russian state in its fall reached the bottom and only very big optimists hoped for its soon revival. 15 years ago, the beginning of the revival of Russia was a fait accompli, but few believed that in the foreseeable future it would be able to challenge the US global championship. 5 years ago, the confrontation between Russia and the United States was obvious to the whole world, and dozens of completely patriotic right and left experts expected that the Russian economy would collapse from day to day under the weight of sanctions. Today, those who most recently laughed at the forecasts of the crisis in the US and the EU, louder than others, talk about the new Great Depression and the coming collapse of the European Union.
UK on the way to the European periphery
Indeed, such a tendency (towards the disintegration of the EU) exists. Moreover, this process is moderated and partially encouraged by at least part of the American elites (Trump-oriented nationalists, as they are now called in the US). For its own reasons, is interested in the collapse of the European Union UK. London failed to become the dominant force in the EU (which is largely due to brexit). And if Britain cannot control a united Europe, Europe should not be united.
A strong, united EU is too dangerous both for Britain and for the USA, as an economic (first of all), and in a possible perspective, a military-political competitor. And if Washington can still hope to win in the fight against a united Europe, then the resources of the current UK are clearly insufficient for this.
The preservation of the EU inevitably leads to the marginalization of the United Kingdom, as a European periphery. Trillion-dollar assets have already been withdrawn from the country in connection with brexit. But nothing has really begun.
Moreover, the interests of the development of the European economy require an active and fairly rapid reorientation towards cooperation with Russia. Moreover, the further development of economic relations should inevitably lead in the future to a military-political alliance.
As already mentioned, all these trends exist and I wrote about them repeatedly. But it was not by chance that I pointed out at the beginning of the material not only the dynamism of changes, but also the inconsistency of the modern world. There will be a counter-trend for every trend, for a variant of the future there will always be several more possible. The very situation of a global systemic crisis (suggesting a fundamental change in all the rules of the global political and economic game that we know) pushes the elites of various states to model various options for the future.
Between the elite groups focused on different variants of the future, contradictions are growing and the struggle is getting tougher.
At the same time, the vision of the future of each of the opposing groups is often so controversial that we find it difficult to say which victory of the general European tendencies today corresponds to Russia’s long-term interests, and who can be a tactical companion at best.
Strategic front of confrontation
In Europe, as in the United States (as is the case in Russia and the rest of the world), with a huge variety of tactical solutions offered, the strategic front of confrontation passes between globalists (in Russia they are called liberals, although it is more correct to call them compradors, because patriotic liberals) and conditional nationalists (it would be better to call them traditionalists, since the nationalist regimes in the Baltic States and in Ukraine are quite comprador).
The first ones are stronger, the closer their state is to the top of the “golden billion”. As they exhale, they are trying to overcome the crisis of globalism, to return to the “golden age” of unconditional American hegemony, within the framework of which it is not necessary for their countries, but for their own prosperity. The latter propose to abandon the unipolar model of the world order in favor of the priority of the interests of the national state.
They are not against globalism as such. They simply see the future of the global world in the complex coordination of national interests, and not in the imposition of a single left-wing model of universal tolerance for everyone, implying the erosion of not only state sovereignty and traditions, but also the boundaries of society, family, personality and even gender.
In Russia, China, in all dynamically developing economies, the power in the past decades has been unequivocally controlled by traditionalists. At the same time, their coming to power was dictated by national interests – the preservation of statehood was possible only within the framework of opposition to American globalist hegemony. Therefore, the establishment of the power of traditionalists in these countries took place on the basis of a national consensus (which is especially well seen in the example of Russia).
Gradually, this consensus is eroding, but so far the confrontation between globalists and traditionalists in these countries has not reached such acuteness as in the United States and the EU.
In the US, traditionalists won the presidential election. But under the control of globalists (regardless of their party affiliation) remained the Congress and most of the federal departments. Therefore, Trump is waging a grueling struggle, trying to destroy the administrative bastions of globalists and gradually incorporate into the administration and Congress supporters of his course.
In the EU, power remains in the hands of globalists at the level of the European Union, as well as in such key countries as France and Germany, with quite traditionalist governments operating in Greece, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and now in Italy.
I don’t accidentally list famous traditionalist governments. For most of them, the traditionalist is identified with the pro-Russian position. But it is not. Sympathy towards Russia is expressed by the authorities of Slovakia and Italy, Hungary and Greece rather pursue a moderate pragmatic policy, while the Poles take a pronounced anti-Russian position and are oriented towards the United States. At the same time, the globalist governments of France and Germany, being interested in preserving the EU, also strive to pursue a balanced pragmatic policy, inherently close to the principles of Hungary’s foreign policy (although on certain issues the contradictions between Berlin and Budapest remain acute).
Tell me who are you?
To a certain extent, we can come to some generalization. In general, globalists are interested in preserving the EU and even in strengthening its manageability through the gradual transformation from a union of states into a union state (federation). Traditionalists, as a rule, advocate the dissolution of the EU or at least do not see any special value in it. A typical example is the blatant trick of the leaders of the Italian ruling parties, who publicly supported the “yellow vests” who advocate for the collapse of the EU, against the globalist Macron who is for strengthening the European Union.
Traditionalists for the most part advocate the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions. They are pragmatists, and sanctions are detrimental to their economies. But at the same time, the collapse of the EU, which traditionalists support or, at least, do not oppose it, is in the interests of the United States (whose ambassador to the European Union calls it an obstructionist and archaic superstructure). Russia also benefits from the implementation of the Macron-Merkel plan for the gradual transformation of the European Union into a federal state under Franco-German control.
Objectively, the circumstances are such that France and especially Germany can achieve their goal only in close economic and military-political alliance with Russia. Consequently, the federated Europe under their control will be a Russian ally, regardless of the opinion of various Poles ‘and other Swedes,’ whose opinion simply will not interest anyone. If the EU collapses, the continent will become the space of active and dangerous rivalry between Russia and the United States.
At a minimum, Eastern Europe and most of the Balkans, and possibly almost the whole of Northern Europe, will remain focused on the United States. Promising for the Russian foreign policy game will be Germany, France, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia (possibly the Czech Republic, Denmark and Belgium). Italy will be a highly unstable partner, oscillating between different centers of power.
Taking into account the militaristic psychosis that engulfed the Poles, the Balts and, to a lesser extent, Romanians, the rivalry for Europe, in the event of the collapse of the EU, will become explosive in nature. Polish claims of reparations from Germany, voiced within the EU, are perceived in different ways and lead to far ambiguous consequences. Moreover, the Polish army is quite comparable to the German army in combat power, but in fact it even surpasses the Bundeswehr, most of whose vehicles do not travel, fly, or swim.
The situation was similar on the eve of the Second World War. Sometime before 1936-1937, the Poles were stronger than the Germans and did not even have time to notice how the situation had changed.
Just as now, Poland, hoping to rely on Washington, pursues both anti-Russian and anti-German policies, and in the period between world wars, Warsaw, feeling itself the military-political leader of Eastern and Central Europe, also criticized Berlin (except for a brief period warming relations in 1934 – early 1939), and Moscow. It ended with the disappearance of Poland from the political map.
The problem is that there are some hidden contradictions, like the German-Polish, in the EU a dime a dozen. In the event of the collapse of the European Union (which would entail the destruction of NATO), they immediately emerge, and traditionalist governments are much less inclined to compromise than globalist ones (trying to keep the EU from disintegration) and much more need to demonstrate to the population the harshness in defending national interests.
The seemingly incredible European war in one “beautiful” day can become as real as the collapse of the USSR or the civil war in Ukraine (few people believed in the possibility of it in November 2013 in Kiev and Moscow).
We do not exclude the worst and hope for the best
Actually, the Kremlin clearly understands the threat posed by the instability and unpredictability of the EU’s development. New armies and divisions deployed in the western strategic direction are not needed to frighten Ukraine. She is already afraid, and, for the most part, her population sees liberation in the occupation. Most do not mind getting the Russian standard of living without any effort, and the Bandera minority will gladly try on the role of political refugees (“government in exile”) somewhere in Canada or in the United States. The anecdote about “write, mother, immediately captured,” with respect to the Ukrainian army is the same documentary evidence as the film “Wedding in Robin” with reference to Ukrainian politics.
NATO troops are needed precisely in case of complete destabilization of Europe. Of course, military intervention, even in support of the allies, is not the best option. If it comes to guns, the United States can be congratulated with a tactical victory.
This means that Russia will not get a united and strong Europe as an ally, and even after its efforts to extinguish a large fire, it will have to localize local fires and rake firewood for a very long time.
But, for this reason, armies exist, as the last argument, that there are situations in which the possibilities of political and diplomatic influence are exhausted, and it is impossible to let things go to chance, for it will be worse.
The ideal for Russia option – by political and economic means to help establish the Franco-German hegemony oriented towards Moscow in the EU. The option is worse: in the event of the EU collapse, to achieve dominance in Europe of the pro-Russian forces (at the level of key states) through the projection of force, but without resorting to open intervention. The worst possible thing is the emergence of the need for direct intervention to stabilize the situation on the continent (a huge-scale peace-enforcement operation). Nobody will thank us for this, but the alternative may be the infiltration of European instability into Russia.
Judging by the high rates of deployment and saturation of the army with advanced equipment, the Kremlin, considering all the options, has not ruled out the worst for five years. But we still hope for the best.